Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: Alberto Porto
Author-Email: 
Author-Homepage: http://www.econo.unlp.edu.ar/principal/profesor.asp?id=428
Author-Workplace-Name: National University of La Plata
Author-Workplace-Homepage:
Author-Name: Natalia Porto
Author-Workplace-Name: National University of La Plata
Title: Fiscal Decentralization and Voters' Choices as Control 
Abstract: This paper investigates, empirically, the voters` choices as a mechanism
                of control of the municipal governments in Argentina. In particular, the
                paper explores the question of whether voters choose to support the
                political party in office based on its fiscal performance while in office.
                After a learning period, citizens vote considering the fiscal performance.
                The smaller the jurisdiction, the more sensitive the citizens. Voters, in
                evaluating fiscal performance to take voting decisions, consider the
                performance in the recent past. Municipal elections are not a mere
                rehearsal of national or provincial elections. We conclude that we can
                trust in fiscal decentralization and voting. Perhaps, it is a better option
                than fiscal centralization.
Classification-JEL: H72; D72
Keywords: fiscal decentralization; local governments; fiscal performance; voters' choices
Journal: Journal of Applied Economics
Note:
Pages: 135-167
Number: 1
Volume: 3
Year: 2000
Month: May
File-URL: https://www.ucema.edu.ar/publicaciones/download/volume3/porto.pdf
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Handle: RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:3:y:2000:n:1:p:135-167