

# Economic growth

## Class 12

### Creative destruction

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May 27, 2009

Model of Creative destruction

- Aghion and Howitt
- A model of Growth Through Creative Destruction
- Econometrica, 1992
- two elements to the growth model
  - the Schumpeterian idea of creative destruction
  - a simple version of uncertainty
- Research and development

Idea of creative destruction

- New products (inventions) frequently replace old ones
- Some inventions don't make others obsolete
  - people use both for some time (perhaps divided by income level)
  - sometimes compatible with older inventions
- Some inventions are "drastic"
  - older goods or processes disappear relatively rapidly
  - new goods dominate older ones
- Competition for producing new goods is part of the force that drives capitalism

Some examples of creative destruction

- Printing press
  - replaced hand written books
  - made books available to masses
- steam engine, internal combustion engine, electric engine
  - replace animal and water power
  - but adds much animals could not do
- computer
  - replaces typewriter, slide rule, mail, encyclopedia, libraries
  - adds calculating power
- television or computer games
  - replace life (ok: reading, playing music, conversation, games)
  - adds new forms of entertainment
- Digital camera

Some examples of creative destruction

- On a more micro level
- individual products
- Frequent updates
- new characteristics added
- new design (works better, looks nicer)
- new ways of producing something similar
  - flat panel televisions
- Some goods have very short lives (computer parts)

Schumpeter

"The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers' goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new markets,...[This process] incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure form within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating the new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.

from: Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1942) *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, New York, Harper Brothers, p. 83.

.Creative Destruction

- Positive side
  - implies a negative relationship current and future research with results in
  - the existence of a unique steady state growth path
  - the possibility of cyclical growth patterns
- Normative side
  - current innovations have positive externalities for future research and development
  - they exhibit a negative externality on current (incumbant)producers (the business stealing effect)

.The model: general aspects

- Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth in a context of uncertainty
- Growth in generated by a random sequence of quality improving innovations that come from research and development activities
- Vertical innovations implies that new inventions make old ones obsolete
- Research is carried on by firms that, if successful, have a monopoly on the technology they produce (a patent) until it is replaced by a better technology

.The model: general aspects

.Three types of labor

- Unskilled labor used only in final good production
  - we will fix the amount at  $M = 1$ , all supplied
  - is combined with an intermediate good to produce the final good
- Skilled labor used in intermediate good production and in research
  - in fixed supply, all used, but divided between the 2 uses
  - more intermediate good production means less research
  - $N = L_t + n_t$  where  $L_t$  is used in intermediate good production and  $n_t$  in research
- Specialized labor (not in our version of the model) used only in research (here  $R = 0$ )




Figure 1: Drawing of the model

Idea behind research

- Invention of new goods or processes is random
- but the probability distribution depends on the labor spent on research
- More labor spent in a period, more likely the research will be successful sooner
- Probability is in terms of an arrival model
  - new inventions arrive
  - arrive faster if more labor used in research
  - alternative way of thinking: waiting time before new invention arrives
  - arrival times and waiting times are inverses of each other

Production and technology

- Production technology
 
$$Y_t = A_t x_t^\alpha L_u^{1-\alpha}$$
- where  $A_t$  is technology in stage  $t$ ,  $x_t$  is the amount of the intermediate good,  $L_u = 1$  is the fixed amount of unskilled labor
- changes in technology arrive with an arrival rate  $\lambda n_t$  where  $n_t$  is the total labor used in research
- The arrival rate comes from a Poisson distribution with the density function

$$f(k|n_t\lambda) = \frac{(n_t\lambda)^k e^{-n_t\lambda}}{k!}$$




Figure 2: Poisson arrival rates

- Arrival rates are how many innovations arrive in a given period (we really haven't defined a period yet)
- the Poisson distribution tells us the probability that exactly k innovations will arrive in a period
  - some other uses of a Poisson distribution: bombs

The Poisson distribution

- Poisson distribution for  $k = 1, \dots, 10$  and  $\lambda = .3$

Waiting times

- How long one waits between arrivals
- Expected waiting time is  $1/\lambda n_t$
- Waiting times are an exponential distribution

$$f\left(x \mid \frac{1}{n_t \lambda}\right) = \frac{1}{n_t \lambda} e^{-\frac{x}{n_t \lambda}}.$$

- When an innovation arrives, it improves technology by a ratio of  $\gamma$  so

$$A_{t+1} = \gamma A_t$$

Waiting times

- Higher  $\lambda$  imply shorter waiting times




Figure 3: Waiting times from exponential distribution

The model: households

- Households provide unskilled and skilled labor to the markets
- unskilled labor is used only in final good production
- skilled labor is used in intermediate good production and research
- both are in fixed supply:  $M = 1$ ,  $N =$  total supply of skilled
- Household maximize

$$u = \int_0^{\infty} e^{-rt} y_t dt,$$

- where  $r < 0$  is the constant rate of time preference,
- and  $y_t$  is the consumption of the final good at time  $t$
- notice that time is continuous
- it will later be broken up into periods of constant technology

The model: Production

- Production of the final good takes place with the technology

$$y_t = A_t x_t^{\alpha}.$$

with  $0 < \alpha < 1$ .

- The intermediate good production is monopolistic, given that only the most advanced technology good is produced, and the production technology is

$$x_t = L_t.$$

- Research generates new technologies at an poisson arrival rate equal to

$$\lambda n_t.$$

- When a technological innovation arrives, its use causes the technology parameter in the final good production to increase by

$$A_{t+1} = \gamma A_t$$

Decision of the monopolist (intermediate good producer)

- The monopolist knows that the final good production function is

$$y_t = A_t x_t^\alpha$$

- uses that to determine what price it should charge the final good producer for the intermediate good.
- The final good producer maximizes the flow of profits as

$$\pi_t^{final} = y_t - p_t x_t = A_t x_t^\alpha - p_t x_t$$

- choosing the amount of intermediate good it wants to use.
- First order conditions are

$$\frac{\partial \pi_t^{final}}{\partial x_t} = \alpha A_t x_t^{\alpha-1} - p_t = 0,$$

- so the (inverse) demand for intermediate goods is

$$p_t = \alpha A_t x_t^{\alpha-1}$$

Decision of the monopolist (intermediate good producer)

- the intermediate good producer maximizes

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_t^{int} &= p_t x_t - w_t L_t = p_t x_t - w_t x_t \\ &= \alpha A_t x_t^{\alpha-1} x_t - w_t x_t \\ &= \alpha A_t x_t^\alpha - w_t x_t. \end{aligned}$$

- First order conditions are

$$\frac{\partial \pi_t^{int}}{\partial x_t} = \alpha^2 A_t x_t^{\alpha-1} - w_t = 0$$

- or

$$x_t = \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\frac{w_t}{A_t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}.$$

Decision of the monopolist (intermediate good producer)

- To be able to talk about stationary states with increasing technology we will need a technology adjusted wage
- $\varpi_t = w_t/A_t$  as the technology-adjusted wage,  $x_t$  is a decreasing function of  $\varpi_t$  of the form

$$x_t = \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}.$$

Monopolist profits

- The intermediate good producer's profits are

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_t &= \alpha A_t x_t^\alpha - w_t x_t \\ &= \alpha A_t \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_t} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} - A_t \varpi_t \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \\ &= \alpha A_t \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_t} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} - \alpha^2 A_t \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_t} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \\ \pi_t &= (1-\alpha) \alpha A_t \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_t} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \\ \pi_t &= A_t \tilde{\pi}(\varpi_t) \end{aligned}$$

How profits respond to wages

- taking the derivative of profits with respect to wages, gives

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \pi_t}{\partial \varpi_t} &= \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} (1-\alpha) \alpha A_t \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_t} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}-1} \left( -\frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_t^2} \right) \\ &= -\alpha^2 A_t \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_t} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \left( \frac{1}{\varpi_t} \right) < 0, \end{aligned}$$

- profits decline as risk adjusted wages increase
- Higher expected future demand for research will drive up wages and reduce the profits from doing research
- This tends to reduce current research

Research

- Inventions occur with Poisson arrival rate  $\lambda$  per worker in research (or with average waiting time  $1/\lambda$ )
- With  $n_t$  workers, arrival rate is  $n_t \lambda$




Figure 4: Innovations path

- for  $\lambda = .3$  and  $n_t = 8$ , a path of innovations looks like

Research

- All inventions are drastic and give inventor patent with infinite life
- Patent becomes useless when next invention occurs
- Inventor only can use (or sell) monopoly rights until the next invention arrives
- expected life of a patent is  $1/(\lambda n_t)$
- Since new technology is known to all: new research starts there
- New invention raises technology by  $\gamma > 1$ , so

$$A_{t+1} = \gamma A_t$$

Research

- Research firms have a flow of expected profits equal to

$$\lambda n_t V_{t+1} - w_t n_t,$$

where  $V_{t+1}$  is the value of the next  $(t + 1)$  innovation.

- Maximizing profits with respect to the number of researchers gives that

$$\lambda V_{t+1} - w_t.$$

- The intermediate good firm that own the time  $t$  technology will not engage in research.

- By doing so it will
  - shorten the expected time it has a monopoly on the technology and
  - if it is successful will have a gain from research equal to  $V_{t+1} - V_t$
  - other research firms will have a gain equal to  $V_{t+1}$ .

#### Research and profits

- The value of the new technology is the expected discounted flow of profits it will produce.
- Notice that the flow of profits is constant over the time that the firm has the lead technology (since production of the final and intermediate goods are constant).
- Call these expected profits  $\pi_{t+1}$ .
- Then the value of the firm is

$$V_{t+1} = \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{r + \lambda n_{t+1}}.$$

#### Creative destruction

- rewrite the value of the firm as

$$rV_{t+1} = \pi_{t+1} - \lambda n_{t+1} V_{t+1}.$$

- this says that the flow of expected profits generated by the firm equals the flow of profits minus the expected loss from being replaced by a new innovation

#### Capital markets

- Need to finance research
- number of ways of doing this
- notice that utility is linear
- this implies that individuals are risk neutral
- researchers can be paid off when their firm invents a new good by getting shares in the monopoly profits

#### Equilibrium

- Only one decision for the economy to make: how many skilled worker in research: choose  $n_t$  in

$$N = x_t + n_t.$$

- Combine this equation with the rest of the equations of the model

$$w_t = \lambda V_{t+1},$$

$$V_{t+1} = \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{r + \lambda n_{t+1}},$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \pi_t &= A_t \tilde{\pi}(\varpi_t) \\ &= (1 - \alpha) \alpha A_t \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_t} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \end{aligned}$$

- This gives

$$\begin{aligned} w_t &= \lambda V_{t+1}, \\ \frac{w_t}{A_t} &= \lambda \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{r + \lambda n_{t+1}} \frac{1}{A_t}, \\ \frac{w_t}{A_t} &= \lambda \frac{A_{t+1} \tilde{\pi}(\varpi_{t+1})}{r + \lambda n_{t+1}} \frac{1}{A_t}, \end{aligned}$$

- or

$$\varpi_t = \lambda \gamma \frac{\tilde{\pi}(\varpi_{t+1})}{r + \lambda n_{t+1}},$$

- where

$$\tilde{\pi}(\varpi_{t+1}) = (1 - \alpha) \alpha A_{t+1} \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

- The other condition for an equilibrium is

$$n_{t+1} = N - x_{t+1}$$

- and

$$x_{t+1} = \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}},$$

- so the wage equation can be written as

$$\varpi_t = \lambda \gamma \frac{\tilde{\pi}(\varpi_{t+1})}{r + \lambda \left( N - \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \right)}$$

- This is an equation of the form

$$\varpi_t = g(\varpi_{t+1})$$

### Equilibrium

- If one prefers, the model can be thought of in terms of a wage equation,

$$\varpi_t = \lambda\gamma \frac{\tilde{\pi}(\varpi_{t+1})}{r + \lambda n_{t+1}},$$

- and a labor market equilibrium equation,

$$n_t = N - \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}},$$

- that can be written as

$$\varpi_t = \frac{\alpha^2}{(N - n_t)^{1-\alpha}},$$

### Perfect foresight equilibrium

- A perfect foresight equilibrium is a sequence of  $\{n_s\}_{s=t}^{\infty}$  where all agents are maximizing their utility or profits and the equilibrium conditions (the wage equation and the labor market equilibrium equation) hold in every period  $s$ .
- Individuals in period  $t$  make their decisions knowing the value of  $n_{t+1}$  and other relevant variables

### Perfect foresight equilibrium

- Take the wage equation (with the function for profits put in)

$$\frac{\varpi_t}{\lambda} = \gamma \frac{(1 - \alpha) \alpha A_{t+1} \left( \frac{\alpha^2}{\varpi_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{r + \lambda n_{t+1}},$$

- substitute in the labor market equilibrium equation for both time  $t$  and time  $t + 1$ ,
- one gets

$$\frac{\alpha^2}{\lambda (N - n_t)^{1-\alpha}} = \gamma \frac{(1 - \alpha) \alpha A_{t+1} (N - n_{t+1})^\alpha}{r + \lambda n_{t+1}}$$

- the left hand side gives the marginal costs of research
- the right hand side gives the marginal benefits of research
- The only variables are  $n_t$  and  $n_{t+1}$

### Perfect foresight equilibrium




Figure 5: Costs and benefits of research: time path

- How to analyze stationary state ( $n_t = n_{t+1} = \bar{n}$ ) or time paths

Some results for stationary perfect foresight equilibria

- Aghion and Howitt give this proposition.

The amount of research employment  $\bar{n}$  in a stationary perfect foresight equilibrium increases with: a) a decrease in the rate of interest, b) an increase in the size  $\gamma$  of each innovation, c) an increase in the total endowment  $N$  of skilled labor, or d) an increase in the arrival rate  $\lambda$ .